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 LETTING GO: NCAA REFORM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
THE UNIONIZATION OF COLLEGE ATHLETES 
Kevin DeMaio* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) and its member institutions have been subject to a litany of 
lawsuits and legal proceedings concerning the legality of their system 
of amateurism and the student-athletes’ ability to earn money while on 
scholarship.1  In a recent court decision in the Northern District of 
California, a federal judge ruled that NCAA regulations, which pro-
hibit student-athletes from earning money from the use of their like-
ness in video games, were an unreasonable restraint on trade.2  The 
court enjoined the NCAA from enforcing any rules that prohibit its 
member institutions from offering a student-athlete a portion of reve-
nues generated from the use of their likeness.3  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently upheld the ruling of the District Court for 
the Northern District of California that the NCAA regulations violate 
antitrust laws.4 
In a similar lawsuit, the NCAA recently reached a twenty-million-
dollar settlement with former college athletes who sued over the use 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Princeton Uni-
versity.  I would like to thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn for his valuable insight and 
assistance.  
 1  See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc. (In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 
(N.D. Cal. 2014); Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-
Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-md-2541-CW (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014), ECF No. 60.  
 2  O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955, 1007–08. 
 3  Id. at 1008 (allowing NCAA to cap the amount of dollars held in trust, but that 
amount can be no less than $5000).   
 4  O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. 14-16601, 2015 WL 5712106, at *26 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 
2015).  The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated the district court ruling in part.  Id.  The 
District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that schools could pay up 
to $5000 in deferred compensation to student-athletes.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed 
and limited the amount of compensation that schools can provide to student-athletes 
to the full cost of attendance.  Id.  
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of their likeness in video games and sought monetary rather than in-
junctive relief.5  In yet another class action lawsuit brought by former 
student-athletes, it is alleged that the NCAA unfairly capped the value 
of athletic scholarships.6  All three of these high-profile cases claim 
some form of antitrust violation on the part of the NCAA. 
Antitrust liability suits, however, are not the only recent legal pro-
ceedings directed at the NCAA and its member institutions.7  Members 
of the Northwestern University Football Team recently petitioned the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “the Board”) for recogni-
tion as employees of Northwestern University (“Northwestern” or the 
“University”) under a labor law theory as a potential solution to their 
grievances.8  The student-athletes claimed that they were “employees” 
as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or “the Act”) 
and, thus, entitled to form a union and collectively bargain.9 
The student-athlete unionization effort is one possibility, but it is 
not the most appropriate solution to solve the problems that currently 
plague student-athletes.  This Comment proposes internal reform to 
the regulatory framework of the NCAA, in the form of major delega-
tion of rule-making authority to individual conferences, as a preferable 
alternative to the unionization of student-athletes.  This will preserve 
the amateur status of intercollegiate athletics in that it will not recog-
nize student-athletes as employees.  Furthermore, it will put the power 
into the hands of the individual conferences, not the NCAA or individual 
universities.  This will result in the individual conferences competing 
with one another to provide the most appealing “additional benefits” 
to prospective student-athletes.  This competition itself will serve as a 
check against the power held over the student-athletes by any single 
entity.  These additional benefits could come in the form of: (1) guar-
anteed four-year scholarships; (2) improved educational benefits; (3) 
long-term disability insurance for sports-related injuries; (4) more flex-
ible transfer and eligibility rights; (5) a grievance process for abusive 
treatment by coaches and administrators; (6) free medical care and 
health insurance for all sports-related injuries; and (7) payment of 
 
 5  Ben Strauss & Steve Eder, N.C.A.A. Settles One Video Game Suit for $20 Million as 
a Second Begins, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/ 
10/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-settles-sam-keller-video-game-suit-for-20-million.html. 
 6  Jerry Hinnen, Sharrif Floyd Plaintiff in Latest Lawsuit Against NCAA, Conferences, 
CBS SPORTS (Apr. 27, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/ 
eye-on-college-football/24541964/sharrif-floyd-plaintiff-in-latest-lawsuit-against-ncaa-
conferences. 
 7  See Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).  
 8  Id. at *1–2.   
 9  Id. at *2. 
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scholarship shortfalls—the differences between the cost of a scholar-
ship and the actual cost of attending a university.10  These structural 
changes will lead to a drastic improvement in the welfare of the Divi-
sion I11 scholarship student-athlete while preserving the NCAA’s ama-
teurism model.12 
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of the issues be-
tween the NCAA and the student-athletes of its Division I member in-
stitutions, as well as introduce the legal framework for a possible solu-
tion: the unionization of these student-athletes.  Part III will analyze 
the unionization effort of the Northwestern University football team,13 
the most recent and prominent case of student-athletes attempting to 
unionize.  While the unionization effort in Northwestern ultimately did 
not result in a designation of employee status,14 it is important to ex-
amine the decision because of the potential implications for similar 
efforts in the future.  Part IV will consider various ways in which indi-
vidual states and universities could avoid student-athletes being desig-
nated as employees, both under the NLRA, which applies to private 
universities, and existing state labor law, which is applicable to public 
universities.  Part V will propose a preferable alternative to the union-
ization of student-athletes—internal NCAA reform in the shape of in-
dividual conference control of the rules and regulations concerning 
allowable non-monetary benefits to student-athletes.  Part VI will con-
clude by stating that this proposal of internal NCAA reform has already 
begun,15 and is the most feasible and preferable solution to the prob-
lems that currently plague NCAA Division I athletics.  This proposal 
will create an “arms race” that will not work to the detriment of the 
student-athlete as has been suggested by previous authors,16 but rather 
 
 10  See, e.g., Jonathan L. H. Nygren, Forcing the NCAA to Listen: Using Labor Law to 
Force the NCAA to Bargain Collectively with Student-Athletes, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 
367–70 (2003) (discussing the goals of the Collegiate Athletes Coalition (CAC)); Ro-
hith A Parasuraman, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 727, 728 (2007) (discussing the goals of the National College Players Association 
(“NCPA”)).  
 11 NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2015) (“Among the three NCAA divisions, Division I schools generally have 
the biggest student bodies, manage the largest athletic budgets and offer the most 
generous number of scholarships.”).  
 12  See infra Part V.  
 13  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014). 
 14  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167, at 1 (2015).  
 15  Sharon Terlep, NCAA Votes to Give Big Conferences More Autonomy, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 7, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/ncaa-votes-to-give-big-confer-
ences-more-autonomy-1407433146.  
 16  See Nygren, supra note 10; Matthew Mitten & Stephen F. Ross, A Regulatory Solu-
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would greatly improve the welfare of the student-athlete. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKA STUDENT-ATHLETE 
UNIONIZATION EFFORT 
While internal NCAA reform would be the optimal solution to the 
problems that both the NCAA and its student-athletes face, the stu-
dents themselves will inevitably explore other possible solutions—such 
as student-athlete unionization efforts—if they do not feel that their 
grievances are being addressed.  An existing legal framework laid out 
by the NLRB addresses this issue.17  In cases such as the unionization 
effort by the scholarship football players of Northwestern University, 
the NLRB governs because it can choose to exercise jurisdiction over 
private entities.18  For example, in the past, student-workers at private 
universities have petitioned the NLRB for the right to unionize.19  The 
students claimed that they were “employees” as defined by the NLRA 
and, thus, entitled to the right to form a union and collectively bar-
gain.20  The general reasoning behind such a case is that a union will 
better represent the interests of the employees who, without collective 
bargaining rights, will have few methods to address their grievances. 
Section seven of the NLRA states that “[e]mployees shall have the 
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.”21  The main problem that the NLRB faces when interpret-
ing this section, however, is who constitutes an “employee.”  The 
NLRA’s definition of the term is rather vague,22 so the NLRB has em-
 
tion to Better Promote the Educational Values and Economic Sustainability of Intercollegiate Ath-
letics, 92 OR. L. REV. 837 (2014). 
 17  See Brown Univ., 342 N.LR.B. 483, 483 (2004). 
 18  29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).  
 19  See Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999); New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 
1205 (2000), overruled by Brown Univ., 342 N.LR.B. 483 (2004). 
 20  See Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 152; New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205.   
 21  29 U.S.C. § 157.   
 22  29 U.S.C. §152(3) (“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee, and shall 
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states 
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequences 
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor 
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent em-
ployment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or 
in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed 
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contrac-
tor, or an individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an em-
ployer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or by any other 
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ployed different tests to determine the precise definition of an “em-
ployee.”23 
A.  New York University Test 
The NLRB previously employed the “right of control” test de-
scribed in the New York University case.24  In this case, a group of doc-
toral students at New York University (NYU) petitioned the board for 
recognition of employee status for work they performed as graduate 
assistants in connection with NYU’s doctoral program.25  The Board 
was tasked with deciding whether these graduate assistants were em-
ployees within the meaning of the Act.26 
In analyzing this issue, the Board determined that the definition 
of employee should be defined broadly to include “any employee”27 
and to “reflect the common law agency doctrine of the conventional 
master-servant relationship.”28  According to the Board, “[t]his rela-
tionship exists when a servant performs services for another, under the 
other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”29  The 
Board determined that the graduate assistants were compensated for 
their work by their employer, and performed services under the con-
trol and direction of the same employer.  The nature of this relation-
ship was, thus, “indistinguishable from a traditional master-servant re-
lationship.”30  Additionally, the Board rejected the idea that the 
graduate assistants should be deprived of the statutory protections af-
forded to employees simply because they are also students.31  Ulti-
mately, the Board found that the graduate assistants were employees 
of New York University, and, therefore, allowed to engage in collective 
bargaining.32 
 
 
person who is not an employer as herein defined.”).  
 23  See Boston Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. at 152; New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205; 
Brown Univ., 342 N.LR.B. at 483. 
 24  New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id.  
 27  Id. at 1205.  
 28  New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1205 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country, 516 U.S. 
85, 93–95 (1995)).  
 29  Id. at 1206.   
 30  Id.  
 31  Id. at 1208. 
 32  Id. at 1209.  
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B.  Brown University Test 
After only a few years, however, the Board overruled the test in 
New York University when it announced its most recent test in the Brown 
University decision.33  Similar to New York University, in Brown, a group 
of graduate students, who performed work as teaching assistants and 
research assistants, petitioned the Board to be recognized as employ-
ees.34  In Brown, the Board determined that New York University was de-
cided incorrectly and explicitly overruled that decision.35  Thus, the 
Board returned to its previous twenty-five-year precedent and utilized 
what could be described as the “primary purpose” or “primary func-
tion” test.36 
The Board looked at the nature of the relationship between 
Brown’s graduate assistants and the university itself.  It examined the 
nature of the employer-employee relationship and asked if the sup-
posed employees’ relationship to the university had a primarily educa-
tional or a primarily economic purpose.37  If the relationship was pri-
marily educational, the Board reasoned that the graduate assistants 
would not be employees, and if the relationship was primarily eco-
nomic in nature, the graduate assistants would be employees under the 
Act.38  In making this determination, the Board considered multiple 
factors including: (1) that the graduate assistants were all students and 
had to be enrolled at the university to hold their position; (2) “[t]heir 
principal time commitment at Brown is focused on obtaining a degree 
and, thus, being a student”; and (3) the money that the graduate assis-
tants received was not “consideration for work,” but rather financial 
aid.39  The Board determined that the relationship between the gradu-
ate assistants and Brown University was primarily educational and that 
their service as graduate assistants was “part and parcel”40 of the core 
elements of their degree; thus, they were not employees.41 
 
 33  Brown Univ., 342 N.LR.B. 483 (2004). 
 34  See id. at 483. 
 35  Id.  
 36  Id.  
 37  Id. at 489. 
 38  Id.  
 39  Brown Univ., 342 N.LR.B. at 488.   
 40  Id. at 492. 
 41  Id. 
DEMAIO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:01 PM 
2015] COMMENT  313 
C.  Governing Law at Public Universities 
Because the NLRB only maintains jurisdiction over private enti-
ties and not public universities,42 the governing law for student-athletes 
seeking employee status at public universities would be the relevant 
labor law statute passed within an institution’s state.43  Therefore, stu-
dent-athletes who attempt to be recognized as employees at public uni-
versities will be much more concerned with the actions of their indi-
vidual state legislatures than with any NLRB decision.  The outcome of 
any such attempt would be much harder to predict and obviously less 
uniform than a unionization effort at a private university due to the 
varying levels of rights afforded to public workers of individual states.  
For example, in twelve states, public employees do not have any type 
of collective bargaining rights,44 while other states grant only a select 
group of public employees the right to unionize.45  It has been sug-
gested that student-athletes may have a good chance to succeed in a 
unionization attempt in a few states, such as Massachusetts, Oregon, 
Kansas, and California,46 while it is hard to predict such an outcome in 
many other states.47  In sum, the result of an effort by a group of stu-
dent-athletes to be recognized as employees at a public university 
would largely depend on the state where the institution is located. 
III.  NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY FOOTBALL TEAM UNIONIZATION 
EFFORT 
A.  Factual Background and Regional Director’s Decision 
In Northwestern University, the College Athletes Players Association 
(“CAPA”) petitioned the Board to allow scholarship members of the 
Northwestern University Football Team to choose whether or not to 
be represented by CAPA for purposes of collective bargaining.48  The 
Regional Director of Region Thirteen of the NLRB, Peter Sung Ohr, 
 
 42  29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
 43  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (2015).  
 44  Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to 
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 1003, 1068 (2012) (noting that 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Utah do not extend any collective bar-
gaining rights to public employees, while Wisconsin “sharply limits the scope of collec-
tive bargaining”).   
 45  Id.   
 46  See Fram & Frampton, supra note 44 at 1045–59.  Prior precedent has recognized 
student tutors and graduate student instructors as employees in each of these states.  
 47  See Fram & Frampton, supra note 44. 
 48  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *2 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014). 
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determined that the scholarship members of the Northwestern Uni-
versity Football Team are employees within the meaning of the Act, 
and, thus, are entitled to vote on representation for collective bargain-
ing purposes.49  Upon review, the NLRB recently declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the scholarship football players in Northwestern,50 effec-
tively denying these scholarship football players the right to form a un-
ion.  The NLRB decided that the structure of Division I football is such 
that “asserting jurisdiction would not promote stability in labor rela-
tions.”51  While the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction and answer 
the question of whether the scholarship football players are employees 
within the meaning of the NLRA, the Regional Director’s analysis re-
mains important because similarly situated student-athletes might 
bring a similar petition before the NLRB in the future.  As a result, it 
is important to be aware of both the factual basis and legal analysis on 
which the Regional Director based his conclusion. 
1. Factual Background 
The Regional Director found that Northwestern University is a 
private university located in Illinois that maintains an intercollegiate 
athletic program and is a member of both the NCAA and the Big Ten 
Conference52 with nineteen Division I varsity sports programs.53  The 
varsity football team at Northwestern has roughly 112 members, 85 of 
whom receive grant-in-aid scholarships.54  Since 2006, Patrick Fitzger-
ald, Jr. has been the University’s head football coach.55 
During the recruitment process, Northwestern awards potential 
football players four-year scholarships compared to the one-year re-
newable scholarships required by the NCAA.56  Officials can revoke 
these scholarships for a number of reasons;57  Northwestern, however, 
maintains a policy “to not cancel a player’s scholarship due to injury or 
 
 49  Id. at *23. 
 50  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167, at 1 (2015).  
 51  Id.  
 52  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *2.  
 53  Id. at *3. 
 54  Id. at *5. 
 55  Id. at *4. 
 56  Id. at *7.  
 57  Id. at *4 (“[T]he scholarship can be reduced or canceled during the term of 
the award if the player: (1) renders himself ineligible from intercollegiate competition; 
(2) engages in serious misconduct warranting substantial disciplinary actions; (3) en-
gages in conduct resulting in criminal charges; (4) abuses team rules as determined 
by the coach or athletic administration; (5) voluntarily withdraws from the sport at any 
time for any reason; (6) accepts compensation for participating in an athletic contest 
in his sport; or (7) agrees to be represented by an agent.”).  
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position on the team’s depth chart.”58  In the past five years, only two 
players have had their scholarships cancelled.59 
Football players at Northwestern are subject to certain special 
team and athletic department rules.60  The time commitment of the 
football players to the sport includes both voluntary and mandatory 
activities, with some players spending forty to fifty hours per week on 
football-related activities during the season.61 
Finally, there were also factual disputes that related to the schol-
arship football players’ ability to schedule classes.  Quarterback Kain 
Colter testified that his “coaches and advisors discouraged him from 
taking [a required chemistry class] because it conflicted with morning 
football practices.”62  On the other hand, Coach Fitzgerald testified that 
“he never told any player that they [sic] could not leave practice early 
because of a class conflict,”63 and if a player had to take a class required 
for his degree that conflicted with practice, the Director of Football 
Operations would “pull them [sic] out of practice about 30 minutes 
early and provide them [sic] a ride to class along with a to-go meal.”64 
2. The Regional Director’s Legal Analysis 
In making his determination, the Regional Director applied the 
common law test and found that the scholarship football players at 
Northwestern met the common law definition of the term “em-
ployee.”65  The Regional Director also found that Brown University was 
not applicable because “the players’ football-related duties are unre-
lated to their academic studies unlike the graduate assistants whose 
teaching and research duties were inextricably related to their gradu-
ate degree requirements.”66  Despite the fact that the Regional Director 
found Brown University inapplicable, he nonetheless stated that, even if 
the Brown University test were applied, the outcome would not change 
and the scholarship football players would still be employees.67  The 
 
 58  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *8 n.8. 
 59  Id. at *44.  
 60  Id. at *10–13.   
 61  Id. at *13–26.  
 62  Id. at *32.   
 63  Id. at *33. 
 64  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *33. 
 65  Id. at *40; Brown Univ., 342 NLRB 483, 490 n.27 (2004) (“An employee is a 
person who performs services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the 
other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”) (emphasis omitted).   
 66  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *53–54.  
 67  Id.  
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Regional Director noted that the Board in Brown considered four fac-
tors in determining that the graduate assistants were not employees: 
“(1) the status of graduate assistants as students; (2) the role of the 
graduate student assistantships in graduate education; (3) the gradu-
ate student assistants’ relationship with the faculty; and (4) the finan-
cial support they receive to attend Brown University.”68 
Finally, the Regional Director rejected the idea that non-scholar-
ship members of the football team share an overwhelming community 
of interest with the scholarship football players and, therefore, must be 
included in the bargaining unit.69 
In sum, the Regional Director found that the scholarship football 
players at Northwestern University were employees within the meaning 
of the NLRA and were granted the right to vote on representation for 
collective bargaining.70  The results of the vote were kept secret, pend-
ing the result of the appeal by Northwestern to the NLRB.71  On appeal, 
the NLRB recently declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case, 
which effectively denied the scholarship football players the right to 
form a union.72  In doing so, it chose not to decide whether or not the 
scholarship football players are employees within the meaning of the 
Act.73  The results of the vote were not released in connection with the 
NLRB decision. 
B.  AnalysisNorthwestern University Scholarship Football Players are 
Not Employees 
1.  The Brown University Test is the Governing Law and 
Should Not Be Disregarded 
The Regional Director should not have disregarded prior Board 
precedent and should have applied the Brown University test.74  The test 
 
 68  Id.  
 69  Id. at *63–65. 
 70  Id. at * 67–68.   
 71  Tom Farrey & Lester Munson, NU Players Cast Historic Vote, ESPN (Apr. 25, 
2014), http://espn.go.com/chicago/college-football/story/_/id/10833981/ 
northwestern-football-players-poised-historic-vote-whether-unionize. 
 72  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167, at 1 (2015).  
 73  Id.   
 74  See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Collegiate Athletic Association in Support 
of Northwestern University at 2–3, Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) (13-RC-121359); Northwestern University’s Reply Brief to the 
Board on Review of Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of Election at 10, 
Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) (13-RC-121359); 
Northwestern University’s Brief to the Board on Review of Regional Director’s Deci-
sion and Direction of Election, Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. 
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from Brown University examines the nature of the relationship between 
an employer and an employee to determine if the employee has a pri-
marily educational or primarily economic purpose.75  In the instant 
case, Northwestern University clearly maintains an academic relation-
ship with all of its students, including its scholarship football players.  
One can suggest that the players’ football duties at Northwestern are 
unrelated to their academic studies, which precludes a finding that 
Brown University should apply.76  The football duties of the student-ath-
lete, however, must be viewed in context, and the overall educational 
relationship between the student-athlete and the University cannot be 
ignored.  Therefore, the Regional Director should have reaffirmed the 
NLRB’s longstanding recognition that “labor law principles cannot be 
mechanically applied in an educational setting,”77 and the test from 
Brown University should have been applied to determine if the scholar-
ship football players at Northwestern were employees within the mean-
ing of the Act. 
The Board has long recognized that an educational setting, in-
cluding the relationship between students and a university, is clearly 
different from a purely economic or industrial relationship between 
an employer and employee.78  In addition, the United States Supreme 
Court has acknowledged the distinction between the respective set-
tings when it noted that “the Board has recognized that principles de-
veloped for use in the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on 
the academic world.’”79 On the other hand, it has been argued that the 
scholarship football players at Northwestern work in an industrial set-
ting because “commercial relationships [in college football] have 
usurped traditional roles in universities.”80  This argument, however, 
does not give appropriate weight to the fact that all of the student-ath-
letes in question are primarily students at an institution of higher learn-
ing.  Few student-athletes will go on to play professional sports while 
 
Mar. 26, 2014) (13-RC-121359); Brief of Amici Curiae University of Notre Dame et al. 
in Support of Northwestern University, Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) (13-RC-121359). 
 75  See supra Part II.B.  
 76  Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 65, 78 (2014). 
 77  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 1.  
 78  NCAA’s Amicus Brief, supra note 74 (citing Adelphi Univ., 195 NLRB 639 
(1972); Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 NLRB 621 (1974); Brown Univ., 34 NLRB 
483 (2004)).  
 79  NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680–81 (1980) (citing Syracuse Univ., 204 
NLRB 641, 643 (1973)). 
 80  Labor Law Professors’ Brief Amici Curiae at 12, 19–20, Northwestern Univ., 
2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014) (13-RC-121359). 
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many will utilize the degrees that they earned as a result of their studies 
in this academic setting, not of their time spent on athletics. 
Moreover, a university maintains an inherent level of control over 
all of its students—not just scholarship football players—that is vital to 
the academic mission of the university.81  This relationship is different 
from the typical control exercised by an employer over its employees; 
therefore, the common law test should not be applied, and the test 
from Brown University should have governed the Regional Director’s 
analysis.82 
2. If the Test from Brown University is Applied, the 
Scholarship Football Players at Northwestern are Not 
Employees 
Under the relevant test from Brown University, the scholarship 
football players at Northwestern should not be considered employees.83  
As previously discussed, the test from Brown University examines the na-
ture of the relationship between an employer and an employee to de-
termine if the employee had a primarily economic or primarily aca-
demic purpose.84  The Regional Director stated that the Board in Brown 
considered four factors in identifying the graduate assistants as non-
employees: “(1) the status of graduate assistants as students; (2) the 
role of the graduate student assistantships in graduate education; (3) 
the graduate student assistants’ relationship with the faculty; and (4) 
the financial support they receive to attend Brown University.”85  Here, 
the Regional Director inappropriately analyzed multiple factors of this 
test.86  As a result, the scholarship members of the Northwestern Uni-
versity Football Team should not be entitled to employee status under 
the Brown University test.87 
The first factor of the Brown University test set forth in the Regional 
Director’s analysis requires an examination into whether the supposed 
employees are primarily students or not.88  The Regional Director de-
termined that scholarship members of Northwestern’s football team 
 
 81  Brief of Amicus Curiae National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra 74, at 11. 
 82  Id. at 10–11.  
 83  Id. at 1–3.  
 84  See supra Part II.B. 
 85  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *53 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).  
 86  Brief of Amicus Curiae National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 74, 
at 11–12; Northwestern University’s Brief, supra note 74, at 21–23; Northwestern Uni-
versity’s Reply Brief, supra note 74 at 1; Brief of Amici Curiae University of Notre Dame, 
supra note 74 at 25–30.  
 87  Northwestern University’s Brief, supra note 74, at 21. 
 88  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *54.  
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are not “primarily students,” largely due to the amount of time that the 
student-athletes spend on football related activities compared to the 
amount of time spent on academic duties.89 
This factor is, to some degree, an examination of the amount of 
control the University exerts over the players’ lives.  In this respect, the 
Regional Director incorrectly overestimates the amount of time that 
the student-athletes’ athletic duties require when compared to their 
academic duties.90  The Regional Director stated that during the aca-
demic year, “the players still continue to devote 40 to 50 hours per 
week on football-related activities while only spending about 20 hours 
per week attending classes.”91  He went on to state that, “[o]bviously, 
the players are also required to spend time studying and completing 
their homework as they have to spend time practicing their football 
skills even without the direct orders of their coaches.”92 
This analysis, however, is a flawed evaluation of the student-ath-
letes’ respective time requirements.  The Regional Director dis-
missively concludes that homework and studying are voluntary and 
comparable to non-mandatory football activities, such as “voluntary 
conditioning or strength training”93 or voluntary “7-on-7” drills.94  The 
“voluntary” football-related activities performed “without the direct or-
ders of their coaches”95 in this analysis, however, were already included 
in the Regional Director’s estimate that the scholarship football play-
ers devote forty to fifty hours per week to football-related activities dur-
ing the regular season.96  As a result, the Regional Director actually 
counted the amount of “voluntary” time required of the scholarship 
football players twice in his analysis.  This caused the Regional Director 
to overestimate the amount of time required of the scholarship foot-
ball players and, more generally, the amount of control the University 
exerts over their lives.  Therefore, in examining the first factor on ap-
peal, at the very least, the Board must conduct further investigation 
 
 89  Id. at *54–55. 
 90  Id. at *15 n.11, 17 (discussing the players’ voluntary “weight conditioning or 
strength training” and “7-on-7” drills, which the Regional Director includes in his esti-
mate that the scholarship football players are required to commit around forty to fifty 
hours per week to football-related activities).   
 91  Id. at *55.   
 92  Id. (emphasis added).   
 93  Id. at *15 n.11.  
 94  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *17. 
 95  Id. at *55.  
 96  Id. at *15–21 (including the voluntary activities of “weight conditioning or 
strength training” and voluntary “7-on-7” drills to conclude that during the regular 
season, many players regularly devote forty to fifty hours per week to football-related 
activities).  
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into whether this error resulted in a substantial enough difference to 
change the Regional Director’s analysis.  This could very well result in 
a finding that the football players should be considered primarily stu-
dents and not employees. 
The second factor of the Brown University test should also weigh in 
favor of not recognizing the student-athletes as employees.  This factor 
looks at the supposed employees’ responsibilities and how they relate 
to the academic setting of the University, as well as the students’ edu-
cational degree requirements.97  Here, while the student-athletes’ foot-
ball-related duties do not merit the receipt of any academic credit and 
are not a core element of the degree requirements,98 the athletics pro-
gram as a whole, including the football team, is certainly “part and par-
cel” of the University’s educational mission.99  “[E]ducation [at a col-
lege or university] is a far more expansive concept . . . [that] 
encompasses not only academic activities but also extracurricular and 
other activities engaged in by virtue of a student’s enrollment there.”100  
Education in this regard should be viewed broadly.  It should be noted 
that participation in Division I scholarship athletics is different from 
merely participating in extracurricular activities because this extracur-
ricular participation is linked to the student-athlete’s financial aid.  
Nonetheless, the fact that the football players do not receive academic 
credit for their football-related duties should not be dispositive of the 
idea that their responsibilities are not closely related to the overall mis-
sion of the University. 
The third factor examines the employees’ responsibilities and 
their relationship to the academic faculty.101  The Regional Director 
found that football coaches, and not members of the academic faculty, 
supervised the players’ football-related duties.102  The Regional Direc-
tor correctly concluded that this factor most likely favors a finding of 
employee status for the student-athletes.103 
The fourth, and final, factor evaluates the type of compensation 
received to determine whether scholarships constitute financial aid or 
“compensation for services performed.”104  In evaluating this factor, the 
 
 97  Id. at *55–57. 
 98  Id.  
 99  Northwestern University’s Brief, supra note 74, at 19. 
 100  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 5. 
 101  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *57–58. 
 102  Id.  
 103  Id. 
 104  Id. at *41–44.  
DEMAIO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:01 PM 
2015] COMMENT  321 
Regional Director found that the scholarships received are not finan-
cial aid, but rather compensation for services performed.105  As dis-
cussed later, however, the athletic scholarship tender offer (“tender 
offer”) is not a contract for hire.  Additionally, the amount of the foot-
ball players’ scholarships is not determined by the amount of time 
spent on football-related activities or one’s position on the team’s 
depth chart.106  Rather, every scholarship player receives the same 
amount which is determined by the cost of tuition, food, books, and 
other similar expenses.107 
It is true that universities offer football players this financial aid 
because they play football, and if they did not play football, their finan-
cial aid could be revoked.108  This offer of financial aid to play football, 
however, is no different than the financial aid offered to any other stu-
dent at Northwestern for a different purpose.109  The fact that the fi-
nancial aid in question is conditioned upon remaining a member of 
the football team does not, by virtue of that fact alone, transform it into 
compensation for services.  As a result, this factor also favors recogniz-
ing the football players as primarily students and not employees.110  As 
a result of this analysis, the scholarship football players at Northwestern 
University should not be considered employees under the Brown Uni-
versity test. 
3. Under the Common Law Test Used by the Regional 
Director, the Student-Athletes Are Not Employees 
Even if the Regional Director used the common law test in deter-
mining the employment status of the petitioners in this case, the 
Northwestern University football players should not be employees.  In 
his analysis, the Regional Director utilized the following common law 
test: “Under the common law definition, an employee is a person who 
performs services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the 
other’s control or right of control, and in return for payment.”111  The 
University’s scholarship football players do not meet this common law 
 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at *8 n.8 (“The Employer’s own policy is to not cancel a player’s scholarship 
due to injury or position on the team’s depth chart as explained in Head Coach Fitz-
gerald’s scholarship offer letter to recruits.”).   
 107  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *5. 
 108  Willborn, supra note 76, at 77.  
 109  See infra Part III.B.3.  
 110  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 10.  
 111  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *40 (citing Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. 483, at 490 n.27 (2004)).  
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test’s requirements and, therefore, are not employees within the mean-
ing of the Act. 
The most glaring issue with the Regional Director’s finding that 
the petitioners qualify for employee status under this common law test 
is that no “contract for hire” existed in this case.112  The Regional Di-
rector erroneously claims that the tender offer presented to prospec-
tive student-athletes constitutes a contract for hire.113  On the contrary, 
the tender offer merely is an offer of financial aid,114 which is no differ-
ent than a financial aid offer made to any other student at Northwest-
ern University, whether the offer is merit- or need-based.115  As a matter 
of fact, all student-athletes at Northwestern, not just football players, 
are required to sign a tender offer to receive financial aid.116  Further 
supporting this conclusion is the fact that the tender offer “makes no 
mention of [the terms] ‘employment’ or ‘labor’ or ‘services’ or 
‘hire.’”117  Additionally, the supposed employer in this case, Northwest-
ern University, does not even control the wording of the tender offer; 
rather the Big Ten Conference “dictates the language of the Tender 
of Financial Aid.”118 
On the other hand, some have noted that a contract for hire is 
not always necessarily included in the common law definition of an 
employee.119  Rather, the appropriate common law definition of em-
ployee states: “A worker is an employee when she ‘performs services 
for another, under the other’s control or right of control, and in re-
turn for payment.’”120  Based on this definition, any argument over the 
need for a contract for hire becomes moot.  This, however, was not the 
common law definition that the Regional Director employed in his 
analysis. 
The second problem with the Regional Director’s common law 
analysis is that the grant-in-aid scholarships awarded to members of 
Northwestern’s football team are not “compensation for services.”121  
 
 112  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 10–12; Brief of Amici 
Curiae University of Notre Dame, supra note 74, at 10–15.  
 113  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 10; Northwestern Univ., 
2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *40. 
 114  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 10. 
 115  Id. at 11. 
 116  Id. at 12.  
 117  Northwestern University’s Brief, supra note 74, at 7.  
 118  Id. at 6.  
 119  See Willborn, supra note 76, at 70–71.   
 120  Id. (citing New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205–06 (2000)).   
 121  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 11–12; Northwestern 
Univ.’s Brief, supra note 74, at 34.  
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The Regional Director claims that, “it is clear that the scholarships 
[that] the players receive [are] compensation for the athletic services 
they perform for the [e]mployer throughout the calendar year, but 
especially during the regular season and postseason.”122  In making this 
assertion, however, the Regional Director disregarded three key facts: 
(1) that the scholarships are not processed or distributed through the 
University’s payroll system; (2) that the players are not taxed for the 
receipt of their scholarships; and (3) that the players do not receive 
employment benefits of any kind from Northwestern.123  Also, “[t]he 
amount of financial aid is not dependent upon either athletic talent 
(merit) or effort (time spent), but rather is determined by the cost of 
tuition, food, housing and books.”124 
In sum, the scholarship members of the Northwestern University 
Football Team are not employees under the Brown University test or the 
common law definition utilized in the Regional Director’s analysis.  
Therefore, the players should not be considered employees within the 
meaning of the Act, and the Board was correct not to affirm the deci-
sion of the Regional Director. 
IV.  METHODS TO AVOID “EMPLOYEE” STATUS FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES: 
NLRB AND STATE LABOR LAW 
This Comment argues that the scholarship football players in 
Northwestern are not employees within the meaning of the NLRA.  On 
appeal, the NLRB did not decide this issue; rather, it declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the petitioners.125  In effect, the NLRB did not 
agree or disagree with the Regional Director’s decision in declining to 
exercise jurisdiction, but still denied the scholarship football players in 
Northwestern the right to unionize.126  The NLRB’s decision, however, 
only applies to the scholarship football players at Northwestern Uni-
versity, and not to similarly situated student-athletes at other schools,127 
due to the fact-specific and case-by-case nature of NLRB proceedings.  
Any other university, private or public, could take proactive measures 
to avoid employee status for its student-athletes.  The Regional Direc-
tor’s analysis in Northwestern provides guidelines for any entity that 
wants to minimize the chance that it will be considered an employer in 
 
 122  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *41–42 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 
2014).  
 123  Northwestern University’s Brief, supra note 74, at 34.  
 124  Northwestern University’s Reply Brief, supra note 74, at 12.  
 125  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167, at 1 (2015). 
 126  Id.  
 127  Id.  
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relation to the student-athletes over whom it exercises control.128  
These guidelines may be different for a private university over which 
the NLRB maintains jurisdiction and a public university subject to state 
labor laws.  Nonetheless, if an entity closely examines the decision of 
the Regional Director in Northwestern and adjusts its conduct accord-
ingly, its chance of being deemed an employer will likely decrease. 
First, many of the actions that a private institution could under-
take to avoid employer status would likely come in the form of dimin-
ished control over the lives of its student-athletes.129  For example, an 
athletic department could require its coaches and academic advisors 
to reduce the amount of control that they maintain over the class 
scheduling and other academic endeavors of student-athletes.130  Also, 
the university could voluntarily reduce the amount of athletic respon-
sibilities, such as practice time, that the athletes must attend.  Although 
training camp lasts for only one month, the Regional Director stresses 
that student-athletes are obligated to spend fifty to sixty hours per week 
on football duties during this time.131  If the university, and not the 
NCAA, were to reduce this time commitment, it would demonstrate 
that the student-athletes lives are not dominated by their athletic obli-
gations. 
Public institutions could undertake some of the same measures as 
private institutions; however, these entities are not subject to the juris-
diction of the NLRB,132 but rather to the law of the state where the uni-
versity is located.133  Therefore, the legislature of that state will play a 
much larger role in determining if student-athletes are entitled to col-
lective bargaining rights.  If the legislature were persuaded to adopt 
legislation less favorable to public employees with collective bargaining 
rights, then the student-athletes would not have a good chance to earn 
such rights. 
Finally, the individual conferences of the NCAA can agree that 
they will take no steps to treat their student-athletes as employees.  
 
 128  See Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *10–38 (noting the factors 
that the Regional Director used in his decision: (1) the special rules to which players 
are subject; (2) the amount of time that the players are required to spend on “football-
related activities”; (3) the Tender offer of Financial Aid that serves as an employment 
contract).  
 129  See id. at *45–50 (noting that “players who receive scholarships are under strict 
and exacting control by their Employer throughout the entire year”).  
 130  See id. at *49 (referring to this level of control as a factor in the decision: “[I]t is 
clear that the players are controlled to such a degree that it does impact their academic 
pursuits to a certain extent.”).   
 131  Id. at *54–55.  
 132  29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).   
 133  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167, 6 (2015).  
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Such an agreement would take place between the conferences and 
their member institutions, and it would likely include some of the 
measures described in this section.  A university, in abiding by such an 
agreement, would inevitably reduce the amount of control that it ex-
ercises over its student-athletes.  Thus, the university agrees that it will 
not take any steps to treat its student-athletes as employees.  If such a 
solution were implemented, it would not be dispositive on the question 
of employee status, but likely would be highly persuasive in demon-
strating the nature of the educational relationship as opposed to an 
employment relationship. 
V.  INTERNAL NCAA REFORM IS PREFERABLE TO THE UNIONIZATION 
OF STUDENT-ATHLETES 
While the unionization of Division I scholarship student-athletes 
may not be the answer, other commentators have suggested different 
solutions to solve these problems that currently plague the NCAA and 
its member institutions.134  For example, one alternative proposal states 
that student-athletes should be allowed to unionize, which might, con-
trary to popular belief, actually preserve the current NCAA intercolle-
giate athletic model as an alternative to professional sports.135  An alter-
native proposal advocates for the appointment of an independent 
federal commission to oversee the NCAA rulemaking process.136  The 
NCAA could be incentivized to accept the suggestions of the independ-
ent commission if offered a “carrot,” such as exemption from antitrust 
liability.137  Another proposal, rather than advocating change of the 
NCAA’s current amateurism model or declaring student-athletes as 
employees, supports granting student-athletes a limited form of collec-
tive bargaining rights.138  These rights would not include the right to 
strike or earn wages, and would use the “union substitution effect”139 to 
put pressure on the NCAA to provide a voice and additional benefits 
to student-athletes.140 
 
 134  See Fram & Frampton, supra note 44; Mitten & Ross, supra note 16; Michael H. 
LeRoy, An Invisible Union for an Invisible Labor Market: College Football and the Union Sub-
stitution Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1077 (2012); Nygren, supra note 10; Parasuraman, su-
pra note 10; Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining Ama-
teurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555 (2009).  
 135  Fram & Frampton, supra note 44, at 1010, 1071–72.   
 136  See Mitten & Ross, supra note 16, at 868–76.  
 137  Id. at 877.  
 138  See generally LeRoy, supra note 134. 
 139  Id. at 1136 (“The union substitution effect shows that employers respond to 
credible threats of unionization by providing individuals more voice and better finan-
cial treatment.”).   
 140  Id. at 1089–91.  
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There are many possible solutions to the problems that the 
NCAA, its member institutions, and student-athletes currently face.  All 
of these deserve consideration as potentially viable solutions; however, 
a simpler, more effective way to deal with these existing problems is 
internal reform of the NCAA.  Internal reform to the existing structure 
of NCAA regulation of allowable benefits to Division I student-athletes 
is the most appealing solution to the problems that currently plague 
the NCAA. 
A. The Specifics and Implications of the Proposed NCAA Internal 
Reform Plan 
The proposed internal reform would most likely occur by means 
of a vote of the NCAA Division I Board of Directors (the “Division I 
Board”).141  The Division I Board is comprised of various Division I 
members and is one of the committees established to direct the ongo-
ing operations of Division I.142  It could vote to delegate regulatory au-
thority concerning student-athlete welfare and allowable benefits to 
the individual “Power Five” Conferences.143  In this proposal, the NCAA 
would still retain regulatory authority for the on-field rules of compe-
tition.  The individual “Power Five” Conferences would be allowed, 
however, to make rules and regulations for their member institutions 
concerning allowable additional benefits. 
The NCAA could maintain a very limited sphere of authority as it 
relates to these additional benefits for student-athletes.  For example, 
in order for its member institutions to retain competition eligibility in 
the newly created College Football Playoff system,144 the individual con-
ferences could agree that they will take no steps to treat their member 
 
 141  See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASSOCIATION, DIVISION I MANUAL, 
CHANCELLORS AND PRESIDENTS  art. 5 (201415 abr. ed. 2014), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/14chancellors.pdf. 
 142  Division I Committees, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, 
http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees?division=d1 (last visited Feb. 12, 
2015).  
 143  See generally DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 141; Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes 
to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8 2014, 1:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-votes-allow-autonomy-five-power-confer-
ences (explaining that the “Power Five” Conferences consist of sixty-four schools that 
make up the five richest conferences in Division I athletics: the Atlantic Coast Confer-
ence, the Big 12 Conference, the Big Ten Conference, the Southeastern Conference, 
and the Pacific-12 Conference).   
 144  See College Football Playoff Overview, COLLEGEFOOTBALLPLAYOFF, http://www.col-
legefootballplayoff.com/overview (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (explaining that the Col-
lege Football Playoff is a new postseason format for Division I Football Championship 
Subdivision (FCS) football teams that allows a committee to select the four best teams 
to determine the FCS National Champion). 
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student-athletes as employees.  If this agreement takes place at the con-
ference level, it will bind the member institutions.  The member insti-
tutions would then most likely take proactive steps, such as reducing 
the amount of control that they exercise over student-athletes,145 to 
avoid its student-athletes garnering employee status.  Outside of that 
limited restriction, the individual conference would possess the power 
to declare what types of benefits its member institutions could provide 
to student-athletes. 
These benefits would most likely come in many different forms.  
Some possible forms include: (1) guaranteed four-year scholarships; 
(2) improved educational benefits; (3) long-term disability insurance 
for sports-related injuries; (4) more flexible transfer and eligibility 
rights; (5) a grievance process for abusive treatment by coaches and 
administrators; (6) free medical care and health insurance for all 
sports-related injuries; and (7) payment of scholarship shortfalls (the 
difference between the cost of a scholarship and the actual cost of at-
tending a university).146  If the individual conferences allow these ben-
efits, they all could potentially be available to student-athletes of the 
“Power Five” Conferences. 
Competition among the individual schools and between the indi-
vidual conferences would be the driving force behind this system of 
regulation.  Individual institutions try very hard to be the most appeal-
ing destination for prospective student-athletes (“Recruits”)147 because 
many of these Recruits possess rare, non-fungible abilities to perform 
on the football field and are, therefore, highly sought-after.  As a result, 
the individual institutions would most likely encourage their confer-
ence to pass more flexible regulations concerning additional benefits.  
The conferences would then respond to the needs of their member 
institutions and regulate as they see fit.  This competition would force 
the conferences to establish a regulatory framework that is both ap-
pealing and beneficial to Recruits, who maintain strong bargaining po-
sitions in choosing schools due to the high demand for their unique 
skill sets. 
In all, schools and conferences will be vying to attract the most 
promising Recruits.  The conferences will compete with each other in 
 
 145  See generally supra Part IV.  
 146  See Nygren, supra note 10, at 367–70; Parasuraman, supra note 10, at 728–29. 
 147  Alicia Jessop, The Economics of College Football: What the Top-25 Teams Spend on Re-
cruiting, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 9:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football-what-the-top-25-spend-
on-recruiting/ (discussing the amount of money that each Top-25 Athletic Program 
spent on recruiting for men’s sports in the 20112012 academic year, topped by the 
University of Alabama which spent $1,402,041).  
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an “arms race” or “race to the top” in order to be the most appealing 
destination for Recruits.  This “arms race” will greatly improve the wel-
fare of the student-athlete by allowing individual conferences to regu-
late and provide their member schools with the ability to provide stu-
dent-athletes with additional benefits. 
B. Policy Considerations: Why This Proposal is Superior to a Student-
Athlete Unionization Effort 
Internal NCAA reform is a superior alternative to a student-ath-
lete unionization effort because it will avoid the difficult analysis that 
accompanies case-by-case determinations of employee status.  Because, 
as previously discussed, the NLRB maintains jurisdiction over private 
entities,148 its determinations would govern any student-athlete unioni-
zation efforts at private institutions. 
There are currently seventeen private institutions that maintain 
Division I Football Bowl Subdivision programs.149  Therefore, determi-
nations of whether student-athletes at these schools qualify as employ-
ees would have to be made on a case-by-case basis.  An amicus brief in 
Northwestern stated: “There are likely over 10,000 football players receiv-
ing scholarships at one-hundred and twenty universities. Denying this 
group employee status would thus exclude a significant number of in-
dividuals from statutory labor protection.”150  The situation is much 
more complex than that statement suggests, however, and such a 
group could not be excluded from statutory labor protection as a result 
of one decision.  Rather, student-athletes of each Division I private in-
stitution athletic team could petition the NLRB for collective bargain-
ing rights.  The NLRB would be tasked with hearing proceedings for 
each case due to the fact-specific nature151 of the analysis.  While this 
type of system may be perfectly appropriate to resolve labor disputes in 
other settings, it would not be an efficient method to solve the prob-
lems that student-athletes face at private member institutions of the 
NCAA. 
Additionally, there would be a similar level of uncertainty if stu-
dent-athletes at a public university sought recognition of employee sta-
tus.  The NLRA specifically exempts “any State or political subdivision 
 
 148  See supra Part IV. 
 149  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *4 n.2 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014). 
 150  Labor Law Professors’ Brief Amici Curiae, supra note 80, at 19–20.  
 151  Some factors to consider in this fact-specific analysis would be the level of con-
trol that the university exercises over the private life of the student-athlete, the type of 
financial aid or scholarship that the university offers, and the amount of student-ath-
letes’ time that the university requires.  See Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 
221, at *40–52. 
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thereof” from its reach,152 so an effort to be recognized as an employee, 
including a student-athlete unionization effort at a public university, 
would be subject to the labor law of the state where the university is 
located.  This would cause even more uncertainty for the student-ath-
letes of the NCAA.  A student-athlete at a public university could be an 
“employee” if his university was located in a state with robust protection 
for its public workers.  At the same time, another student-athlete com-
peting in the same sport, at the same level of competition, but at a 
different public university with less robust statutory protection or a pri-
vate university, may not be entitled to similar benefits.  This uncertainty 
was the major reason that the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction 
in Northwestern.153  The Board cited the fact that, while it could exercise 
jurisdiction over Northwestern, it could not exercise jurisdiction over 
the “vast majority” of Division I Football Bowl Subdivision teams.154  The 
Board decided that the structure of Division I Football Bowl Subdivi-
sion is such that “asserting jurisdiction would not promote stability in 
labor relations.”155 
Furthermore, internal NCAA reform will preserve the NCAA’s 
amateurism model.156  NCAA student-athletes are, by definition, ama-
teur athletes and not professional athletes.157  The unionization of stu-
dent-athletes, however, would challenge the existing model, and po-
tentially lead to a professionalization of intercollegiate athletics.  This 
could harm the institution as a whole by altering the nature of athletic 
competition on the field, while also destroying any notion of a broader 
educational purpose in intercollegiate athletics. 
In arguing against this type of internal NCAA reform, some com-
mentators have theorized that individual conferences possessing con-
trol over the regulations and rulemaking process might lead to an 
“arms race.”158  It is suggested that this “arms race” will harm the NCAA 
because “certain conferences would dominate intercollegiate athletics 
 
 152  29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006).   
 153  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 167, 1 (2015). 
 154  Id. at 5. 
 155  Id. at 6. 
 156  DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 141, art. 2, § 9 (“Student-athletes shall be ama-
teurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily 
by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.  Student 
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should 
be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”).  
 157  Id. 
 158  See Nygren, supra note 10, at 394; Mitten & Ross, supra note 16, at 849.   
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because they were more willing to grant student-athletes extra bene-
fits.”159  Along the same lines, Dartmouth University President and 
NCAA Division I Board Member Phillip J. Hanlon recently stated, “I 
worry these changes [granting more autonomy to individual confer-
ences] will further escalate the arms race in college sports, which, in 
my opinion, is not in the best interest of intercollegiate athletics, or 
higher education more generally.”160 
This argument is not persuasive because it ignores the fierce level 
of competition in Division I athletics.  The “Power Five” Conferences 
and their member schools would be competing with one another to 
attract potential student-athletes and ultimately for success on the play-
ing field.  This inherent competition will create a dynamic that will 
benefit the student-athlete.  This level of competition will serve as a 
check on the amount of control that the individual conferences would 
be afforded.  For example, if one conference achieves athletic success 
by offering the most appealing additional benefits, then the other con-
ferences will likely follow.  The existence of such an “arms race” in in-
tercollegiate athletics would not harm the welfare of the student-ath-
lete.  Rather, this “arms race” would improve the welfare of the student-
athlete, more so than if the student-athletes were left to advance their 
own interests without this strong level of competition driving the reg-
ulation of the “Power Five” Conferences. 
An additional, and similar, argument against reform is that NCAA 
member universities could not effectively govern themselves because 
they are too “economically self-interested.”161  The reasoning behind 
this argument lies in the idea that the member institutions of the 
NCAA will put self-interest above all else and the individual student-
athlete will suffer.162  While this might be true if the individual member 
universities of the NCAA held the majority of the rulemaking author-
ity, it most likely will not be true if the conference, rather than the 
individual university, holds the rulemaking authority.  The “economi-
cally self-interested party” will seek the most advantageous rules and 
regulations for itself.  But, this self-interest will be tempered by the fact 
that rival institutions of the same conference will benefit from the same 
 
 159  Nygren, supra note 10, at 394.   
 160  Marc Tracy, NCAA Votes to Give Richest Conferences More Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-
votes-to-give-greater-autonomy-to-richest-conferences.html (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 161  See Mitten & Ross, supra note 16, at 857. 
 162  See id.  
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rules.  The organization of rules concerning allowable additional ben-
efits at the conference level, rather than the individual school level, 
will drastically reduce the self-interest factor. 
C. Reform Process is Already Underway 
The type of reform process advocated in this Comment has al-
ready begun.  The Division I Board recently voted to give the “Power 
Five” Conferences the power to make their own rules concerning the 
provision of additional benefits to student-athletes.163  The changes 
would not destroy the current amateurism model of intercollegiate 
athletics and would not allow individual conferences to pay student-
athletes for on-field performances.164  Rather, the rules would be “lim-
ited to specific areas such as loosening recruiting curbs, offering more 
comprehensive health insurance and letting schools cover the gap of 
roughly $2,000 to $4,000 between what a scholarship typically pays and 
the actual cost of attending school.”165 
These rules are not yet in effect, and, if enough NCAA Division I 
member schools oppose the proposed rule changes, the Division I 
Board will reconsider them at the next meeting.166  The individual con-
ferences, however, are the regulatory bodies best suited to address the 
concerns of the modern student-athlete.  In order to preserve amateur 
intercollegiate athletics, this deregulation must continue, and the in-
dividual conferences should retain the most authority in the rulemak-
ing process. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Northwestern University scholarship football players should 
not be considered employees.  The NLRB declined to exercise its ju-
risdiction in Northwestern.  Even if the NLRB had exercised its jurisdic-
tion, the scholarship football players do not fit within the legal defini-
tion of employees and should not be entitled to collective bargaining 
rights. 
Additionally, putting aside any NLRB decision and simply viewing 
the issue as a matter of policy, a student-athlete unionization effort is 
not the most appropriate way to address the problems of the NCAA.  
Only a few Division I universities are private institutions, and thus, sub-
ject to the NLRA.  Therefore, targeting reform at the conference level 
 
 163  Terlep, supra note 15.  
 164  Id.  
 165  Id.  
 166  Id.  
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rather than at the individual university level is the most appropriate and 
comprehensive way to solve this issue.  This internal NCAA reform 
would include the delegation of rulemaking authority to individual 
conferences.  If individual conferences control the rules and regula-
tions concerning the distribution of non-monetary benefits to student-
athletes, these conferences will compete with one another to provide 
the most appealing additional benefits to prospective student-athletes.  
This competition will drastically improve the welfare of the student-
athlete.  These non-monetary benefits will come in the form of more 
flexible transfer rules, stricter mandatory time limits on sports-related 
activities, a stronger devotion to health concerns—specifically concus-
sion-related issues—and a more transparent grievance process.  If 
meaningful internal NCAA reform, as suggested within this Comment, 
occurs, unionization efforts will be unnecessary to improve the welfare 
of the student-athlete, and the NCAA, its member institutions, and its 
student-athletes will all benefit. 
 
